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Foreword 
During the master thesis course in European and International Taxation at Lund University, I 
quickly found that the tax avoidance aspect of international taxation interested me, both from 
the perspective of the taxpayer and that of tax authorities’. Especially since I knew that in my 
home country, Iceland, that area of tax law was almost unheard of. When deciding on a 
master thesis topic I was thinking about how I could make use of this interest. In the middle of 
that consideration, I saw a news report from Iceland regarding these aluminium plants and 
their owners. How they seemed to be taking an advantage of the lack of any rules regarding 
thin capitalization to avoid paying any income tax and instead paid huge amounts of tax-free 
interests to their parent and sister companies in Luxembourg and the Netherlands. I contacted 
the reporter, he was kind enough to provide me with some of his findings, and during our 
talks, the topic of this examination was formulated. I would like to thank Helgi Seljan for 
providing me with data I would have otherwise had trouble getting myself and for giving me 
an idea for this thesis. I would also like to thank my tutor, Axel Hilling, for his help during the 
working process. 
 
        Jón Bjarni Steinsson  
        May 27, 2013 
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Abstract 
An examination of how thin capitalization of companies works, rules put in place to counter 
such behaviour, their affects and how or if such rules might help in a situation in Iceland 
where multinational corporations seem to be taking an advantage of such rules to avoid 
paying any income tax. 
Keywords: Thin capitalization, Interest deduction limitations rules, tax avoidance, tax 
planning, Iceland, Germany, Denmark.  
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1. Introduction 
Question: Is it possible to solve problems associated with multinational corporations 
taking advantage of the lack of Thin Capitalization rules in Iceland with current 
legislation or by implementing new rules? 
1.1. Background 
In Iceland, there are no thin capitalization provisions although the Supreme Court has held, 
with a reference to the main principle behind article 57(1) of the Income Tax Law (general 
anti avoidance rule based on the arm’s length principle, that a transaction may be disregarded 
if its purpose is only to circumvent tax legislation. According to a report from the IMF, that 
has ever since the collapse of 2008 monitored and looked closely into the tax environment in 
Iceland, taxation of corporate profits in Iceland is a classical system that is generally in 
accordance with the systems found in other European countries. A consistent and efficient tax 
system does not require major changes. There are specific aspects, however, where the current 
economic situation has brought to the surface some shortcomings related to the treatment of 
holding gains and losses, debt forgiveness, complex financial operations, and excessive 
leverage.
1
 The corporate tax introduces a bias in favour of debt opposed to equity financing. 
This is because in the hands of the corporation, profits are taxable while interest payments are 
deductible. The tax authorities consider that there are indications of excessive debt financing, 
often motivated by tax avoidance objectives. At present, the tax authorities’ only possibility to 
confront these practices is by using either the arm’s length provision (article 57 ITA) or the 
anti-avoidance concept developed in case law. Neither of these approaches seems to be 
effectively applicable in Iceland and the authorities consider that their capacity to challenge 
and prevent thin capitalization practices should be strengthened.
2
 
1.2. Subject and Purpose 
A committee report on tax evasion in Iceland from 2004 stated that it was necessary to impose 
a tax on interest payments out of the country since the lack of such legislation would 
encourage tax evasion where companies would set up groups of companies where a foreign 
group provides a resident company with a loan. The profit of the Icelandic company is 
transferred offshore in the form of high interest payments, considered as deductible expenses. 
                                                 
1
 International Monetary Fund - Improving the Equity and Revenue Productivity of the Icelandic Tax System, p. 
18 
2
 International Monetary Fund - Improving the Equity and Revenue Productivity of the Icelandic Tax System, p. 
21 
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The interest payments themselves not taxed when going out of the country to the foreign 
company. The report added that the fact that interest payments were not taxed leaving the 
country was in accordance with the basic tax procedure of taxing dividends, sales and 
operational profits.
3
In an article about the economic impact of heavy industry in Iceland the 
ex head of the Icelandic tax authority, Indriði H. Þorláksson, discusses the need to tax the 
interest paid out of the country to foreign entities.
4
 These interest payments are income 
originating in Iceland, income where the state feels the need to ensure its share of the revenue. 
Indriði also suggests that to not tax the interest paid out of the country increases the likelihood 
of tax avoidance because the companies are able to use these payments of company profits go 
out of the country without it ever being taxed. Indriði also mentions the fact that interest costs 
are considered deductible operating expenses that decrease the tax base so by these measures 
dividends are being disguised as interest to avoid paying taxes.
5
  
The purpose of this examination is to look at the lack of thin cap rules situation in Iceland 
with the example of the aluminium plants in mind. By analyzing and then comparing 
Icelandic laws with Danish and German laws in relevant areas of corporate taxation the plan 
is to provide some useful guidance as to which steps would be the best to take in order to 
counter these sorts of tax avoiding behaviours now or when implanting regulations in Iceland 
regarding thin capitalization.  
1.3 Method and Material 
This thesis will conduct a traditional comparative law analysis, first by identifying a real life 
problem regarding thin capitalization of certain multinational corporations operating in 
Iceland, then by studying how possible tax planning relating to such financing is resolved in 
two different countries with interest deduction limitation rules. The two countries chosen are 
Germany and Denmark. Denmark is chosen mainly because Danish legislation was originally 
the basis for Icelandic laws so there are many similarities, Germany was chosen because its 
interest deduction limitation rules are relatively new and for the fact that in a recent report the 
IMF recommended that Iceland implemented rules similar to the German ones if they decided 
to adopt such rules. The starting point for this paper will be the relevant domestic law 
provisions with comparison to the other chosen jurisdictions, the OECD Model convention 
and other material found relevant by the author. The thesis will analyse domestic sources of 
                                                 
3
 I Þorláksson, Skýrsla starfshóps um umfang skattsvika á Íslandi, p. 35. 
4
 I Þorláksson: „Efnahagsleg áhrif stóriðju á Íslandi“, 
5
 I Þorláksson: „Efnahagsleg áhrif stóriðju á Íslandi“, 
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law, such as preparatory work and scholars’ articles, devoted to the topic in order to assess the 
compatibility of the rules and enable a critical comparison. It should be noted that this project 
was undertaken partly because this is a very current issue in Iceland and is intended mostly 
for Icelandic readers, hopefully as means to provide possible solutions. Therefore, some of the 
sources used are Icelandic since in many cases no sources of information existed in any other 
language. Moreover, some of the sources used are in English but are not available outside of 
Iceland or on the internet; those will be made available through a file provided for in a link at 
the end of the bibliography. It is the hope of the author this alternative approach will be 
forgiven. 
1.4 Delimitations  
In the course of the research for this paper it became obvious that in parts, especially when it 
came to thin capitalization in general or the different approaches taken in various jurisdictions 
many articles and papers have been published and very often authors of such publications do 
not agree. It would in the authors mind not have lead to the desired results if all material 
published had been considered in this paper; instead an attempt was made to include the ones 
relevant to the research question. Originally, the plan was to include the Swedish and Dutch 
systems along with the German and Danish ones; it however soon became clear that Swedish 
authorities have almost identical problems as the Icelandic do. The Dutch system also did not 
seem very helpful have since the Dutch system of thin cap rules was abolished and replaced 
by a new system very recently.  
Although thin capitalization rules are in fact different from interest deduction limitation rules, 
they are a response to the same problem. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, the term 
‘thin capitalization rules’ will also cover interest deduction limitation rules where relevant.  
Finally, the reader should be aware that some sources necessary for the purpose of research on 
the matter were not available in any other language then Icelandic, where needed this author 
translated to English. The goal of this examination is as mentioned above to provide some 
guidance to the situation in Iceland; therefore, Icelandic sources need to be relied upon. 
1.5. Outline 
In line with the comparative legal method, following the introduction and the presentation of 
the problem in chapter 2, an explanation of the subject (thin capitalization) the relevant 
national law provisions of Denmark and Germany and Iceland will be presented in Chapters 3 
4 
 
and 4. Following this, Chapter 5 will discuss possible solutions, while the conclusions of the 
author will be put forth in Chapter 6. 
2. Is There a Problem?  
In Iceland there are a few big aluminium smelters with one more at least is on the drawing 
board. Recently an Icelandic investigative reporter pointed out that the owners of two of the 
largest ones were not paying any income taxes in Iceland, that they instead had large debts 
with their sister or parent companies to which they pay tens of Ms US$ in interest every year. 
Below is a picture that roughly shows how this is set up. 
6
 
This in itself does not necessarily need to be a problem from the government’s point of view; 
these smelters generate a lot of revenue for the state by other means than direct income tax. 
Such as the income taxes of its workers and the purchase of goods and services. However, 
when before mentioned reporter asked members of government they did indeed see this as a 
                                                 
6
 Annual reports of Alcoa and Norðurál 
 
•Debt/Equity ratio = ? minus Equity past years 
•Debt 1677 million $ 
•Equity -142 million $ 
•Capital 3,5 million $ 
•Interest paid between 2008-2011 to its sister company 
Alcoa Global treasury in Lux - 260 million $ 
•Income tax paid since founding in 2003 - 0 Kr.  
•Carry forward losses against future taxes -  140 million $ 
Alcoa Ice 
•Debt/Equity ratio 43:1 
•Debt 900 million $ owed to its sister company in 
Amsterdam -  Century Aluminum BV Amsterdam Holland, 
shelf company with no operations other then owning that 
debt. 
•Interest paid 2010 and 2011 - 80 million $ each year at 
9,75% interest 
•It then lent its 2 subsidiaries, Norðurál Helguvík and 
Norðurál Grundartangi combined 400 million $ at 8% 
interest 
•Does not pay dividends to its parent company in the US 
(would be taxed at 5%) Instead its profits go the shelf 
company in Amsterdam as interest 
Norðurál 
Ice 
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problem. When interviewed Steingrimur J. Sigfusson, Minister of Industry and Innovation 
said:  
„Well, it is very difficult to come to another conclusion than that the companies are 
finding ways to make a huge profit go this way through the high-interest terms on 
enormous debt which these companies are financed with and very little owners’ equity. 
Which causes their returns here domestically in our tax environment completely different 
from what one would feel it should be. This must of course be dealt with, that is obvious. 
This is of course a certain method to increase profits. This is compatible to over-pricing 
supplies into the factories. Moreover, I believe this gives full cause for the tax authorities, 
the Commissioner of the Inland Revenue or the Inspector of Taxes, to look into these 
cases, including the terms of these loans and there are certain clauses in tax law, which 
could be looked into in this regards. In addition, of course right should be right. One feels 
it is normal that these companies are making good profits, e.g. because they have access 
to low electric energy prices. “7 
Therefore, it is obvious that it is not the intent of the government that this kind of tax planning 
schemes be possible. The government wants a solution that enables the tax authorities to tax 
that income at its source in Iceland, rather than to have the profits shipped out of the country 
tax free in the form of interest. The simplest way would probably be to introduce some sort of 
interest deduction rules, but there Icelandic authorities run into another problem. It seems as if 
the Aluminium plants might have been made “immune” to any future legislation regarding 
limitations on interest deductions. In laws regarding the governments authorization to make 
investment contracts
8
, for an aluminium smelter in Reyðarfjörður
9
. And in similar acts 
regarding plants in Grundartangi
10
 and Helguvík
11
, it is provided that the agreements can 
contain an exemption from any provisions of ITC regarding deductions of interests in such a 
way that as the aluminium plants are concerned, they shall remain unchanged during the 
maturity of those agreements. With such an agreement, the plants seem to have ensured that in 
the event that the legislature decides to make rules that limit the deductibility of interest or 
rules regarding thin capitalization, those provisions would not apply to the smelters. As an 
example the agreement regarding the smelter in Reyðarfjörður says: “The deductibility of 
interest expense shall remain unchanged during the Initial Term as it is under Act No. 
                                                 
7
 H Seljan, interview in Kastljós,  21/13 2013– link to english transcript availble in refrence list. 
8
 These are special agreements the Icelandic government sometimes does in certain situations with companies or 
corporations planning to invest substantially in some form of industry 
9
 Art. l6(11), act no. 12/2003 
10
 Art. 6(12, act no. 62/1997 
11
 Art. 4(7) (act no. 51/2009  
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75/1981 on Income Tax and Net Worth Tax, as amended, on the date of the signing of this 
agreement.“12 another one regarding the one in Helguvík says that: “After signing of this 
Agreement the Company is exempted from changes that may occur on provisions regarding 
deduction of interest costs in the Act on Income Tax, taking into account the OECD 
Guidelines on Arm’s Length Principles and Transfer Pricing“.13 The agreement regarding 
Grundartangi originally contained no such provision, but it was added in 2008.  
On those laws and contracts, Steingrimur J. Sigfusson said in the same interview as quoted 
above: 
„But our problem is that the old agreements were made in such an atrocious manner that 
the companies are very well guarded and ensured, to some extent indefinitely into the 
future, with the exception that certain types of taxes can be imposed here. This is 
unfortunately how things were done in the case of Alcoa Reydarfjordur. In that case, a 
special clause was put into the agreement that the company is protected against changes 
to being allowed to take these huge interest payments due to enormous loans which the 
companies here are made to carry and pay instalments to their associate- or parent 
companies abroad. Therefore, we saw that we would not be able to cut this off, even 
though we were to impose rules about minimal owners’ capital, unless it would be 
possible to prove that the terms of these loans are off the charts.“14 
How these contract provisions possibly affect any future legislation regarding interest 
deduction limits in Iceland remains completely unclear, what little this author has seen on the 
matter seems to indicate that most believe that nothing can be done. This will be discussed 
further in later chapters. 
Steingrimur then added that to counter the problems the legislator started with so-called CFC-
rules, preventing Icelandic parent companies from transferring their dividends to subsidiaries 
in tax havens and therefore forcing them to take up group taxation. The next step decided was 
the adoption of so-called Thin Capitalisation Rules, and that preparations for these rules had 
been in full motion within the Ministry of Finance since his time there.
15
 [Around 2009]  
Conclusion: It is the view of members of government that there is a problem. Large 
corporations with source income in Iceland are not paying any income taxes related to the 
                                                 
12
 Investment agreement for Aluminum smelter in Reyðarfjörður. 
13
 Investment agreement for Aluminum smelter in Helguvík. 
14
H Seljan, interview in Kastljós,  21/13 2013– link to english transcript availble in refrence list 
15
 H Seljan, interview in Kastljós,  21/13 2013– link to english transcript availble in refrence list 
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profits associated with that income. Seeing as Iceland is an OECD member, and the fact that 
its guidelines are even mentioned in one of the investment agreements, art. 7 of the OECD 
model convention should be kept in mind, as it stipulates the generally accepted principle of 
double taxation conventions that an enterprise of one State shall not be taxed in the other State 
unless it carries on business in that other State through a permanent establishment.
16
Para. 2 of 
that article then contains the central directive on which the attribution of profits to a 
permanent establishment is intended to be based. The paragraph incorporates the view that the 
profits that should be attributed to a permanent establishment are those, which that permanent 
establishment would have made if, instead of dealing with the rest of the enterprise, it had 
been dealing with an entirely separate enterprise under conditions and at prices prevailing in 
the ordinary market. This corresponds to the “arm’s length principle” of article 9 in the 
convention.
17
 The will of the government is to tax that income while Icelandic tax laws seem 
to lack any provisions that could allow such taxation. In the works are new laws whose aim is 
to give authorities tools to counter this sort of tax planning schemes, there are however some 
difficulties and questions that might need to be answered in order to apply such legislation 
efficiently. The following chapter will examine thin capitalization, the purpose of thin cap 
rules and how they work. 
3. Thin Capitalization  
In this chapter, the aim is to look at what it exactly means when said that a corporation is 
thinly capitalized, why that is often considered negative from the tax authorities’ point of 
view, and finally how that “problem” has or can be addressed. 
A firm can increase its value by using debt finance instead of equity finance, making use of 
interest deductions. A firm's capital structure choice, however, involves not only the debt-
equity decision. Some companies also have the choice between internal and external debt 
finance. In the context of multinational firms, this choice entails complex issues of 
international tax planning.
18
 
A company is said to be ‘thinly capitalized’ when it has a high proportion of debt capital in 
relation to its equity capital. The significant differences that apply in most countries to the tax 
treatment of debt on one hand, and equity on the other, have made thin capitalization a 
                                                 
16
 OECD Model Tax Convention 
17
 Revised commentary on Article 7 
18
 G Wamser, ‘The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules on External Debt usage‘,p. 1 
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popular method of international tax planning.
19
In recent years, thin capitalization and 
international debt shifting has been the subject of attention among both policy makers and 
scholars. The standard effect of thin capitalization replacing equity by tax-preferred external 
debt has been well known for decades. With the integration of formerly national financial 
markets and the growing share of multinational companies in world trade, the international 
component, known as international debt shifting, has become more and more worrisome. 
Multinationals use international debt shifting to save tax payments by utilizing differences in 
national tax rates and preferential tax rules. For external debt shifting, evidence shows that 
multinationals excessively load those affiliates generating high net tax savings with external 
debt. On the other hand, to keep overall bankruptcy costs in check, the use of external debt in 
affiliates with low tax savings is reduced, allowing for higher tax savings than in comparable 
domestic firms. For internal debt shifting (borrowing and lending among related affiliates), 
the aim of this game is to deduct interest in high-tax countries while earning interest in low-
tax countries in such a way that the tax savings in the high-tax countries exceeds the increased 
tax liability in low-tax countries. Setting up internal banks in the lowest-taxed affiliate 
maximizes the debt tax shield, which provides all other affiliates with internal debt. In 
particular, non-regulated internal debt shifting can be used as a money machine generating 
tax-arbitrage profits as long as there is positive taxable income.
20
  
The main purpose of thin cap rules is to curb excessive debt financing and tax-revenue losses 
from international debt shifting. Two approaches have been said viable in achieving that goal, 
using either specific or nonspecific thin cap rules. Specific thin cap rules directly tackle the 
use of internal debt from related parties while non-specific thin cap rules do not focus on 
internal debt alone, but in most cases restrict the use of debt in general and have similar 
effects to specific thin cap rules. The most well known example of non-specific rules are the 
US earnings-stripping rules that restrict the deductibility of domestic interest expenses. The 
US denies deductibility of ‘extreme’ interest expenses beyond 50% of a company’s EBITDA, 
if the debt-to-asset ratio lies above a safe harbour of 1.5:1 and if (excessive) interest is paid to 
a related party outside the scope of the US income tax. Since 1993, third-party debt 
guaranteed by a parent company is also treated as restricted internal debt. In 2008, Germany 
followed and extended the US example, denying deductibility of ‘excessive interest expenses 
above 30% of a company’s EBITDA, skipping the safe-harbour clause. Italy followed the 
                                                 
19
 A Duorado and R de la Feria, ‘Thin Capitalization Rules in the context of the CCCTB‘,p. 1 
20
 D Schindler and M Ruf,  ‘Debt Shifting and Thin-Capitalization Rules‘,p. 2 
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German example later in 2008. Use of specific thin cap rules is more common. The majority 
of countries with thin cap rules directly restrict tax deductibility of internal debt and define 
safe harbour ratios where thin cap rules do not apply as long as the internal debt-to-asset ratio 
remains within the safe-harbour ratio, such rules deny interest deductibility for excessive 
internal debt coming from shareholders with significant influence on the management. 
Generally, exemptions for financial institutions apply. Until 2004 most thin cap rules were 
only targeted to foreign investment and did not apply to internal finance by domestic 
investors. In December 2002, however, the ECJ decided in ‘Lankhorst-Hohorst that the 
German thin cap rules at the time violated the principle of ‘freedom of establishment’. 
Because the old rules were only targeted to inbound investors and did not apply to German 
investors that resulted in discrimination against German companies’ loan agreements with 
non-resident affiliated companies or shareholders relative to loan agreements with resident 
affiliated companies or shareholders. This ruling forced nearly all EU countries to reform 
their thin cap rules. One way to deal with with the ruling was to exclude companies residing 
in other EU countries from the application of any thin cap rules. This direction was adopted 
by for example Spain and Portugal. The other avenue, for instance taken by Germany, was to 
apply thin cap rules to both resident and non-resident companies.
21
 
3.1. Denmark 
The deduction of interest expenses is limited by the following three rules (in order): 
(1) Thin capitalization rules: these provide for an interest deduction limitation based on a 
debt/equity ratio of 4:1  
(2) Asset limitation: this provides for a limitation based on value of assets: net financing 
expenses are limited to an amount corresponding to 6.5% of certain assets, with the 6.5% rate 
being adjusted annually on a group basis.
22
. 
(3) EBIT limitation: this provides for a limitation based on annual profits: net financing 
expenses must not exceed 80% of EBIT.
23
 Specifically, net financing expenses below DKK 
20 M are deductible under the EBIT limitation, but may be reduced because of the thin 
capitalization rules. (It should be noted that the thin capitalization rules only apply to 
                                                 
21
 D Schindler and M Ruf,  ‘Debt Shifting and Thin-Capitalization Rules‘, p. 5-6. 
22
 N Bjornhol and I Thiersen - ‘New Danish Limitations on Interest Deductions‘, p. 589. 
23
 N Bjornhol and I Thiersen - ‘New Danish Limitations on Interest Deductions‘, p. 589 
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controlled debt in excess of DKK 10 M.) The DKK 20 M cap is calculated on a group basis. 
The amount will be adjusted annually.
 24
 
Danish tax law does not contain any general definition of the concepts of “debt” and “equity” 
So most funding instruments need to be qualified under the general rules of Danish tax law. 
When the funding instrument issuer is a Danish limited liability company the qualification of 
the instrument for tax purposes may very well be based on the fundamental distinction 
between a contribution and a loan, with a contribution being comparable to an addition to 
equity. Even though the concept of contribution is not defined clearly in Danish tax 
regulations, legal usage, and administrative practice, do provide guidance towards a more 
detailed definition of the concept that relates to transfers of assets (money or assets) to a 
limited liability company in particular, without this company paying a consideration of the 
same value. Therefore, under Danish tax law a contribution may be deemed to exist even 
though the substance of the underlying circumstance is entirely different under civil law. For 
instance, Danish practice shows that in cases where, when granting a loan, it is obvious that 
the borrower will not be able to repay it, the loan cannot be acknowledged as a loan for tax 
purposes, but is deemed a contribution or the like.
25
 
The Danish tax authorities have attempted to extend the area for tax reclassification of 
transactions well defined by civil or company law, the Supreme Court has rejected such 
reclassifications despite the motivation for the transactions in said cases clearly relating to tax 
savings and the transactions not displaying any noticeable commercial substance.
26
 
Unwanted tax consequences of a given classification are usually countered through anti-
avoidance rules or rules that prescribe a given tax treatment of specific types of income, 
deduction and gains/losses. Add to this the more general restrictions resulting from the right 
of deduction for interest expenses, capital losses, etc. being limited under the provisions on 
thin capitalisation laid down in section 11 of the Danish Corporation Tax Act, the provisions 
on the interest deduction ceiling in section 11B and the EBIT provision in section 11C. In 
recent years, this strategy has led to the adoption of a number of complicated anti-avoidance 
rules, which have given rise to considerable interpretation challenges, and which often are not 
consistent.
27
 According to section 2B of the Danish Corporation Tax Act, a Danish company’s 
                                                 
24
 J Hansen and N Vinther, ‘Denmark’, IFA Cahier – The Debt Equity Conundrum , p. 240 
25
 J Hansen and N Vinther, ‘Denmark’, IFA Cahier – The Debt Equity Conundrum , p. 240 
26
J Hansen and N Vinther, ‘Denmark’, IFA Cahier – The Debt Equity Conundrum , p. 246 
27
 J Hansen and N Vinther, ‘Denmark’, IFA Cahier – The Debt Equity Conundrum , p. 247 
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debt e.g. to foreign individuals or companies should be considered equity if the debt claim is 
regarded as contributed capital under foreign tax rules. According to the wording of the 
provision, reclassification does not result in capital gains on debt being considered an equity 
transaction, and capital gains should therefore still be subject to taxation even if the debt is 
reclassified as contributed capital (equity).
28
 
3.2. Germany 
Interest relating to a business activity is tax deductible as a business expense. The 
deductibility of interest is most notably limited by the interest deduction ceiling rule 
(Zinsschranke).
29
 Since interest is, in principle, tax-deductible tax treatment of debt can be 
more favourable. However, the interest deduction ceiling rule has made debt investments less 
attractive.
30
 Loans granted by a shareholder to a corporation are qualified as debt in the 
balance sheet. However, interest payments to a shareholder of a corporation that are not arm’s 
length are not deductible but are treated as dividend payments. Tax groups are treated as 
“one” business for purposes of the interest deduction ceiling rule which can have positive 
effects regarding the deductibility of interest.
31
 German tax law assumes an equity treatment 
of an instrument if a contributable asset has been transferred by the shareholder to the entity, 
which has led to an increase of the entity’s capital. Whereby this capital (a) is not subject to 
free retransfer to the shareholder (e.g. by termination of a loan agreement, etc.) and (b) is 
subject to fulfilling the entity’s liabilities in an insolvency scenario prior to a retransfer to the 
shareholder. Whether or not these criteria are fulfilled has to be decided under the foreign 
civil law applicable to the issued instrument.
32
 
In general, the commercial treatment according to German GAAP is decisive also for tax 
purposes. This is due to the legal principle that tax accounting should be based on commercial 
accounting. This principle was historically established in order to ensure that tax authorities 
could easily determine the accurate and true taxable profit.
 33
 The German GAAP treatment of 
an instrument as debt or equity follows the characterization under German commercial law. 
Thus, financing instruments, which assume liability towards the companies’ creditors, should 
be treated as equity, all other instruments as debt. The debt treatment also applies with respect 
                                                 
28
 J Hansen and N Vinther, ‘Denmark’, IFA Cahier – The Debt Equity Conundrum , p. 247-28 
29
 Fischer,Lohbeck - ‘Germany’, IFA Cahier – The Debt Equity Conundrum, p. 310-311 
30
 Fischer,Lohbeck - ‘Germany’, IFA Cahier – The Debt Equity Conundrum, p. 314 
31
 Fischer,Lohbeck - ‘Germany’, IFA Cahier – The Debt Equity Conundrum, p. 315 
32
 Fischer,Lohbeck - ‘Germany’, IFA Cahier – The Debt Equity Conundrum, p. 315-316 
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to loans, in particular shareholder loans, which are subordinated
34
 and are therefore treated as 
equity under German insolvency laws.
35
 
Following the Federal Tax Court decision, the prevailing method used is the amendment of 
the taxable results e.g. by thin capitalization rules and no longer the reclassification of 
financing instruments as such. The mutual agreement provisions in the double taxation 
treaties are predominantly based on article 25 of the OECD model convention. Thus, there are 
no specific rules dealing with the characterization of an instrument as either debt or equity in 
cross-border taxation issues. Mutual agreements are not published, which is, however, not 
surprising as such agreements concern a specific case and tax secrecy must be observed. If a 
mutual agreement is reached in favour of the German taxpayer, the respective tax assessments 
have to be changed accordingly
36
. 
37
 
Business expenses can generally be deducted from the income earned for determining the 
income tax base. However, as regards interest expenses, certain restrictions under the German 
interest deduction ceiling rule may apply. The deductibility of net interest expense by a 
business is limited to 30 per cent of the current year tax EBITDA and, if applicable, of the tax 
EBITDA of the previous years, unless certain exceptions apply. It applies not only to interest 
on shareholder loans but also to all kinds of remuneration for the provision of capital 
including interest to be paid on ordinary third party bank financing. There is no arm’s length 
test, which would provide relief from this limitation. The rule ultimately causes double 
taxation, as interest earned is taxable at creditor level, while the interest expense may not be 
fully deductible at borrower level. Any non-deductible amount of interest exceeding the 30 
per cent EBITDA cap can only be carried forward and may be deductible in future years.
38
  
In order not to be affected by the limitation on interest deduction, certain exceptions can be 
applied: 
(a) The limitation does not apply if the net interest expenses are below 3 M euro. 
                                                 
34
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(b) Further, the limitation does not apply if the relevant interest paying business is not a 
member of a group of companies, i.e. if it is a stand-alone entity. 
(c) Thirdly, in case of a group of companies, the interest paying business must demonstrate 
that its equity ratio is equal to (with a tolerance of 2 percentage points) or higher than the 
relevant group’s equity ratio as at the last balance sheet date of the previous fiscal year. 
Furthermore in addition to the exceptions (b) and (c), neither the borrower nor any other 
entity belonging to the same group of companies, if any, should owe, up to a certain 
threshold, interest on loans granted by direct or indirect shareholders of the interest paying 
entity holding more than 25 per cent of the share capital in the borrower. The same applies 
with regard to interest on loans granted by related parties of such shareholders or loans 
granted by third parties who have a harmful recourse to such shareholders or related parties. 
The threshold for such interests caused by shareholder debt financing is 10% of net interest 
expenses. Finally, such interest on shareholder debt financing is only regarded as harmful if 
the respective lender and the debtor entity are not members of the same group of companies. 
This is because in such a scenario the interest-owing entity will already be unable to meet the 
requirements of the equity ratio comparison due to the shareholder loan.
39
 
The interest deduction ceiling rule as described above can be considered a major tax 
impediment to achieving the desired tax effects of debt financing. As the definition of interest 
under this rule is very broad there are no (hybrid) financial instruments as such that could 
achieve payments that are tax deductible but do not fall within the scope of the interest 
deduction ceiling rule. However, hybrid instruments, which qualify as equity under German 
commercial law, may be used to improve the debt–equity ratio of German enterprises in order 
to avoid the application of the interest deduction ceiling rule. Similarly, a number of other 
models have been developed which try to avoid the application of this rule. For example, tax 
groups are formed to improve the EBITDA of the controlling enterprise or to achieve the 
deductibility of interest paid to other group members. Businesses formerly owned by only one 
corporation or partnership are being segregated in order to be able to use the threshold of 3 M 
euro several times and loans have partly been replaced by leasing, licensing or similar 
contracts. However, it must be noted that structuring aimed at avoiding the application of the 
interest deduction ceiling rule is frequently not opted for, since the outcome is often uncertain 
and the transaction costs are too high compared to the impact of a limited interest deduction. 
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Under the interest deduction ceiling rule, interest paid on loans granted by shareholders are 
fully deductible, if (a) the threshold of 3 M euro is not reached or (b) there is sufficient 
EBITDA. Thus, if these conditions are met bank loans and equity can be replaced by 
shareholder loans. The interest earned by the shareholders will be taxed in accordance with 
the compensation tax regime if the shareholder owns less than 10 per cent of the shares of the 
corporation.
40
 
3.3. Criticism of German/Danish rules 
The German Zinsschranke has been strongly criticized by German tax practitioners. Some of 
the main arguments raised against it include its high level of complexity; the infringement of 
the net principle, meaning the full deductibility of all expenses related to the business income; 
the regulation of companies exempt from its application; the low level of deductible interest 
expenses, the lack of suitability of the escape clause; and the failure to consider R&D 
expenses incurred for purposes of determining taxable EBITDA.
41
The Danish provisions has 
also been criticised, Bjornhol and Thiersen are of the opinion that the asset limitation rate of 
6.5% seems too low and does not reflect that arm‘s length interest rates may exceed 6.5%. 
They also failed to understand why the fair market value at the year-end is applied, since it is 
difficult to understand why taxpayers who must already take into account the fair market 
value of the assets and liabilities under the thin capitalization rules also need make an 
additional and very different computation under the asset and EBIT limitations. They pointed 
out that while Germany replaced its existing thin capitalization rules with an EBIT limitation 
that option was sadly not debated in Denmark, since the Bill was rushed through the 
parliament.
42
 
Conclusion: As a rule, thin capitalization legislation is aimed at excessive shareholder debt 
financing (internal debt). If the conditions of the rules are met, the deduction of interest 
payments, which relate to shareholder debt financing, is disallowed. Some countries reclassify 
non-deductable interest as dividends. This chapter set its sights on two systems that had been 
recognized being amongst the best in dealing with the problem of thin capitalization, the 
German rules had even been recommended as benchmark for future Icelandic legislation by 
the IMF.
43
 As pointed out though in ch. 3.3 above those systems have been criticized and are 
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considered complex with many ways to circumvent them. However, as mentioned in ch. 3.2, 
loans granted by a shareholder to a corporation are under German rules qualified as debt in 
the balance sheet while interest payments on such loans to a shareholder of a corporation that 
are not arm’s length are not deductible but are treated as dividend payments. In the case of the 
owners of the aluminium plants such rules might in the current situation lead to those interest 
payments being treated as dividends and therefore made taxable. 
The next chapter will take a closer look at relevant Icelandic legislation. How or if thin cap 
rules similar to those discussed here, could or should  be implemented into Icelandic tax law 
will be discussed in ch. 5.  
4. Icelandic Laws  
This chapter will provide an overview of those parts of Icelandic laws that would be relevant 
in any future legislation regarding thin capitalization. The basic principles of tax law will be 
explained, the concept of a consolidated company defined along with some definition of the 
terms costs, interest and dividends in regards to the deductibility of such expenses from the 
tax base of corporations as well as comparing them to similar terms in other jurisdictions and 
international agreements. 
In the statutory interpretation of Icelandic tax laws, the literal meaning of the words is to be 
applied, that is, to interpret them literally and according to the preparatory work, that was the 
basis of said legislation.
44
 The taxation right of the Icelandic authorities on the duty of 
Iceland's natural and legal persons to pay tax on all their income is found art. 1 and art. 2 ITC. 
According to the Constitution, the Parliament makes all decisions regarding financial 
management of the state, and it is the only competent authority to decide by general law 
which taxes shall be imposed, cf. art. 40, art. 77 and para. 2, art. 78 of The Constitution of 
Iceland, laws no. 33/1944 (hereinafter “The Constitution”) which provides for the states 
taxation authority. These provisions of the Constitution give the government and Parliament 
the power to make certain groups, individuals, or legal entities pay money by ways of general 
and applicable standards and without a disclosed unconsolidated consideration.
 45
 
Since the rules relating to thin capitalization of companies focus on company groups it is 
necessary to define the term „ consolidated company„ in Icelandic law. When defining the 
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concept a reference to the definition used in corporate law is needed since the term is not 
defined in tax law. According to corporate law, a company is any independent legal entity that 
controls its own affairs. However, companies can be connected in such a way that they are 
dependent on each other. If such a relationship exists, it is considered to be a consolidated 
company group, that is, when the structure is in a way where one company has such a holding 
in another company, or other companies, that it controls a majority of the votes in, or if for 
any other reason takes effective control of it.
46
As previously stated the income tax code does 
not contain any definitions of company groups, we therefore need to take a look at laws on 
corporations, the Act no. 2/1995 on Corporations (hereinafter CL.) and the Act on Private 
Limited Companies no. 138/1994 (hereinafter PLC.) contain provisions relating to 
consolidated companies. Under the acts, they shall be limited to a group when a corporation is 
in fact controlled by a limited company, the higher one  is called the parent and the others 
subsidiary companies, together they form the consolidated company
47
. In art. 2 CL it is noted 
that the scope of the act covers only Icelandic companies and should therefore apply only to 
corporations, which are established in Iceland. This obviously causes problems when dealing 
with tax measures in cross-border trading within international consolidated companies since 
by that wording the laws seem to leave out multinational corporations. With no definition in 
the tax law, this creates a legal vacuum when it comes to taxing such entities. 
When considering a consolidated group of companies, each company within the group is 
considered an independent legal entity, both in financial  and tax sense, as long as the 
individual meets the legal criteria in Article 2 of the income tax code (hereinafter ITC) on 
independent taxation. When evaluating the legal status of a company within the group, we 
assume that each company is a separate legal entity, although it is part of a consolidated 
group.
48
 
As established in the above, the concept of group or consolidated group is not defined in the 
tax law. However, art. 55 ITC, an article that provides authorization for joint taxation of 
limited liability companies, uses the concepts of parent and subsidiary companies. Companies 
that are considered highly dependent on each other may be jointly taxed, but the condition is 
that the parent cannot own less than 90% if joint taxations, is to be allowed.
49
 Article 55 ITC 
provides a variety of additional conditions for the authorization of joint taxation, including 
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utilization of the tax losses of companies. The benefit of group taxation is the option to utilize 
company's operating loss against the profits of other units within the group. When jointly 
taxed based on art. 55 ITC, the jointly taxed companies are jointly liable for tax payments 
even if the income tax on joint income is levied on the parent company. There are certain 
restrictions on the use of loss of joint taxation, it is for example, not possible to use the losses 
that accrued before the joint taxation against profits of other companies in the consolidated 
taxation after the group became jointly taxed under  paragraph  of art. 55 ITC. 
It is the duty of any natural or legal persons to pay taxes on all of their income.
50
 Corporate 
income tax base is the income provided for in ch. II of ITC, minus deductible operating 
expenses as authorized by art. 31 ITC.
51
 Furthermore, all legal persons subject to tax in the 
country should be subject to tax under the tax code, unless specifically exempted.
52
 Legal 
person’s income tax is to be calculated on net income, which means that from the total income 
can be deducted the total sum of that year’s expenses accrued to earn the income, ensuring 
and withholding it.
53
It is a legal person’s obligation to declare all income, wherever it is 
earned, but expenses they may only deduct if permitted by law.
54
 The permission to deduct 
operating costs is provided for in paragraph 1 of article 31 ITC and is an exception from the 
main principle laid down in art 2 ITC requiring the payment of tax on all of income. 
Exceptions to the main principle of tax law must be provided for in a clear and predetermined 
manner of law, as it is expressly provided for in the Constitution that it is not allowed to levy 
taxes, change, or remove them except by law
55
.  
The rule on worldwide taxation is provided for in ITCs provision on unlimited tax liability. 
The rule regarding persons with unlimited tax liability in Iceland says that persons, be that 
legal or natural, should pay taxes where they are domiciled or in the case of legal entities 
where they are registered, regardless of the source of that income.
56
Persons who are not 
residents of Iceland are required to pay income tax on all income that has its source in Iceland 
and with an added wealth on its assets in the country.
57
 Limited tax shall those individuals and 
legal entities bear which do not meet the requirement on residence or registration in Iceland.
58
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Foreign companies, organizations, and institutions that do not have a permanent establishment 
in Iceland or are there legally registered, carry based on the provision limited tax liability.
59
 
The tax code does not contain provisions that provide that shareholders may not provide loans 
for corporations they own share is. However, art. 107 CL and art. 79 PLCL, prohibit that 
corporation lend money to shareholders. A shareholder can achieve tax efficiency by lending 
money to a corporation instead providing additional capital because the total corporation tax 
on profits is higher than the tax on capital gains.
60
 If the interest rate is higher than is 
customary in comparable loans in the private market, the tax authorities may look the loan as 
equity contribution and tax authorities bear the burden of proof in such cases.  
4.1. Costs 
From income tax and the income of persons arising from commercial or independent activities 
or related to such operations can be drawn: Operating costs, i.e. charges during the year for 
the purpose of earning income, securing and keeping it, including premiums to acquire 
pension rights of employees in pension funds on the basis of mandatory pension insurance 
and pension funds, interest on debt, discounts, currency losses, amortization and depreciation 
of assets, as further provided in the act, and what is devoted to the insurance and upkeep on 
property which returns profits to the operation. There is the strict condition that in order for an 
expense to be deductable, it has for that year, have had the purposes of earning the income.
61
 
It is then a regulation that further provides what costs can be considered as deductible 
expenses
62
. From a ruling by the internal revenue board, which is court of first instance in 
matters relating to taxes, it can be assumed that the burden of proof on the deductibility of 
operating expenses in each case lies with the person who intends to make use of such 
subtractions. As proof of the deductibility of certain expenses taxable, persons can submit 
invoices or other documents relevant to their case. In that particular case, the court said that 
the taxable person had to be the one to blame when not able to provide the court with 
sufficient accounting to prove the legitimacy of his deducted expenses.
63
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4.2 Interests 
The term “interest” as used in article 11 of the OECD Model means income from debt-claims 
of every kind, whether or not secured by mortgage and whether or not carrying a right to 
participate in the debtor's profits. In particular, income from government securities and 
income from bonds or debentures, including premiums and prizes attaching to such securities, 
bonds or debentures. Penalty charges for late payment shall not be regarded as interest for the 
purpose of this Article. In Denmark, the concept of interests is strictly limited and according 
to well-established Danish tax practice includes a regular, periodic payment to the creditor, 
calculated as a certain percentage of the amount owed at the time, for making capital 
available.
64
 Under the German Zinsschranke, debt capital includes all cash contributions to 
capital recorded as a liabilities that do not belong to equity from a tax perspective. According 
to a letter of the German tax authorities, in addition to interest based on a fixed or floating 
interest rate, participations in profits or sales, disagios (prepaid interest), early termination 
costs and other fees paid to the lender are also included in the definition of the term 
“interest”.65 In the Nordic multilateral convention for the avoidance of double taxation with 
respect to taxes on income and on capital,
66the term “interest” is defined in Art. 11(3) as 
meaning remuneration on money lent. A payment from a debtor, which is determined 
according to the function of time, the rate of return and the principal, is interest, regardless of 
what the payment is called or when it is made.
67
 That definition differs from the definition in 
Art. 11(3) of the OECD Model in that it does not expressly say that income from a debt-claim 
is interest whether or not it carries a right to participate in the debtor’s profits. Art. 11(2) of 
the Nordic Convention says that income from a debt-claim is interest, provided it is not a 
dividend covered by Art. 10(6), meaning that if an item seems to qualify as both interest and a 
dividend, the item should be treated as a dividend. 
68
 
When defining the concept of interest in Icelandic tax law art. 8 ITC should be considered 
with art. 49. art. 50. art. ITC, under general law parlances interest are considered periodic 
payments for a loan of money or deferral of payment, determined in advance for a specific 
period, based on a certain percentage of the loan amount or remaining balance at each time.
69
 
The interest concept is broadly defined in the tax code and covers in addition to interests a 
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variety of other charges related to interest claims, it is allows the deduction interests on debt, 
discounts, and currency losses.
70
Full list of deductable interest related expenses is as follows: 
1. Interest on fixed and flexible debt, including defaulting interests. As interest, you may 
consider costs of borrowing, annual, or temporary fixed costs, fees, stamp duty and 
registration costs. As interest in this context are accrued indexation of principal and 
interest.
71
 
2. Mortality of sold securities, bills and any other debt instruments provided that the 
buyer of the securities is known. Discounts shall be calculated by the relative amount 
deducted each year after the instalment period. If the debt is taken over or if the 
obligation to pay falls down before the maturity of the debt, the remaining 
amortization is not deductable from income. A debt taken over in connection with the 
sale of assets, the seller can reduce the sale price of the property that amounts to the 
remaining discounts, if the seller was the original debtor of the overtaken debt.
72
 
3. Currency losses in regards to any liabilities in foreign currencies in the year that rate 
change occurs, depending on the sale price of the foreign currency at the year’s end 
are deductable.
73
 
As before mentioned (in ch. 4.1) it is one of the main principles of the income tax code that 
for costs to be deductable from taxable income it needs to meet the criteria of having the 
purpose of earning income securing it and keep it. Thus, we need interest liabilities that are 
associated with the operation in a way that they are imposed on business or incurred with a 
view of buying properties that are used to gain revenues in its operation. In a recent ruling by 
the Supreme Court, regarding the deductibility of interest of loans taken out to finance 
leveraged takeovers the court said that the general rule set forth in art. 31(1) ITC, regarding 
operating expenses that are deductable from income, is that they should be connected to the 
income that operating year, cf. reference to the Supreme Court ruling in case Hrd. 247/1993 
and in case Hrd. 321/2005. The Court then continued and said that the second para. art. 49 
ITC also stated, with regards to operating expenses, that  they were only to be deductible in 
full if they were linked to business operations’ or independent business activities. Interest 
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rates, discounts and currency losses that did not meet that criteria, were not deductible 
expenses within the meaning of the aforementioned provisions.
74
 
For interest costs to be charged as deductible operating expenses the condition that they are 
related to either a loan or a debt is set out in ITC. However, the deductibility of interest is not 
subject to the condition that the interest is paid regularly so that the payment of interest can 
take place at the beginning or at the end. When the assessment is made whether a loan and the 
claim associated to it are real, whether or not a written contract is in place is important, what 
is the maturity of the loan, what are the insurances for the repayment of the loan, interest and 
so on. The stronger the connection is between the creditor and the debtor, the greater the 
requirements get. If the parties are closely related and the above conditions are not fulfilled 
the tax authorities can deny interest deductions and ignore the loan or look at it as equity, not 
a loan.
75
  
4.3. Dividends 
According to article 10 of the OECD Mode, the term “dividends” is generally meant as 
distribution of profits to the shareholders by companies limited by shares, limited partnerships 
with share capital, limited liability companies or other joint stock companies. Under the laws 
of the OECD Member countries, such joint stock companies are legal entities with a separate 
juridical personality distinct from all their shareholders. On this point, they differ from 
partnerships insofar as the latter do not have juridical personality in most countries.
76
 In 
Danish law the concept of dividends is broadly defined and according to section 16A(2)(i) of 
the Danish Tax Assessment Act dividends generally refers to “anything distributed by the 
company to existing shareholders. In Germany a dividend is a part of the profit that a stock 
company distributes to its shareholders or that what a cooperative society distributed to its 
members. The German legislature does however not use the term dividend, it only refers to it 
in, § 174 Section 2 No. 2 German Stock Companies Act, as „distributable amount“. 
According to art. 10(6) of the Nordic Convention, the term “dividends” means any income 
from shares or certificates, income from other rights, not being debt-claims, participating in 
profits and other income derived from a company which is subjected to the same taxation 
treatment as income from shares by the laws of the state of which the company making the 
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distribution is a resident.
77
 The last part of that definition covers any income from a company 
that is taxed in the source state the same way as income from shares, a definition that is 
broader than the definition in Art. 10(3) of the OECD Model, which refers only to income 
from corporate rights.  Not requiring the existence of corporate rights reduces the danger of 
unresolved classification conflicts, as compared to the OECD Model. A classification conflict 
cannot be based on the disagreement of the contracting states regarding the existence of 
corporate rights as it can under the OECD Model. For example, income from hybrid financial 
instruments or interest in a thin capitalization situation may qualify as a dividend if the source 
state treats the payment as a dividend, even though the instrument cannot be regarded to be a 
corporate right.
78
 Following many years of negotiations, the new Germany-Netherlands 
Income Tax Treaty and protocol was signed on 12 April 2012.
79
 The dividend definition in 
that treaty follows that of the OECD Model, while also including income from distributions 
concerning certificates of a German investment fund (Investmentvermögen) and applying to 
all financial instruments providing for profit-participating payments that are deductible from 
the payer’s tax base. Provisions of the treaty do not apply to convertible bonds or to any 
income associated with rights or debt claims that do not carry a right to participate in profits. 
This provision is in line with German treaty policy and identical wording can be found in 
almost all of Germany’s tax treaties.80 
In Icelandic tax law income as dividends is every delivery of considerable valuables from a 
corporation to its shareholders that can be considered as revenues connected to the share of 
their holdings in the company.
81
 According to CL and PLCL, when organizations that own 
shares in limited and private limited companies receive dividends from the companies they 
are involved in, when their activities are profitable, such payments are with a narrow 
interpretation called dividends
82
. However, in ITC dividends are defined more broadly, that is, 
it is said to be the transfer of values from a corporation that a shareholder has shares in.
83
 
Companies can when receiving dividends deduct from their income an amount equal to the 
dividends received when certain conditions are fulfilled
84
. It should be pointed out though that 
the definition of deductible amounts under art. 31(9) ITC does not fully coincide with the 
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dividends definition of art. 11 ITC and can therefore create circumstances where the payment 
received is deemed as dividends under art. 11, without having the same right to deduction as 
is available under art. 31(9). This is because the deduction authorization refers to CL, while 
art. 11 ITC includes a broader definition of the dividends term. 
Since tax authorities can, subject to certain conditions, consider interest payments as 
dividends in the cases of loans between related parties, you need to look at how tax authorities 
assess whether a transactions is dividends or an interest payment. The binding opinion of the 
head of tax Revenue from 20th of March 2001says which factors should be considered when 
assessing whether a loan should be regarded as a contribution of equity or debt and whether it 
is permissible to consider the capital cost of the loan as deductible expenses, cf. para. 1(1), art. 
31 ITC, the opinion states that the general distinctions between loans on the one hand and 
equity contribution on the other is that the claimant of a loan is entitled to its repayment at 
maturity, i.e. at a predetermined time. On the other hand, the shareholder (or the owner a 
capital contribution) does not have a claim for repayment of his contribution while the 
company is still in operation. Capital contribution therefore is a permanent investment that is 
intended for use by the company that has been invested in, while the loan is inherently 
temporary investment for a pre-determined time. To distinguish between an equity 
contribution and a loan the permanency and the potential repayment are normally important 
factors for consideration. It is nevertheless recognized that in the case of hybrid securities it is 
to some extent unclear whether the investment is considered as a loan or capital a 
contribution.
 
The opinion then says that when comparing art. 8 and art. 9 ITC it is evident that 
the definition of interest is much broader than the definition of dividends. Art. 8 ITC covers 
interests on bills, bonds and all other financial instruments bearing dividends or interests 
while art. 9 ITC on the other hand according to its wording only applies to “objects and 
shares” and the income from "partial ownerships". Thus, it appears that art. 9 assumes that 
dividends can only be present in the case of an ownership of a company through shares, and 
that those shares are the base for which there can be any distribution of dividends. Therefore, 
a claim against a company will not be considered capital in that context, only actual 
ownership, i.e. shares that give rights in accordance with CL.
 85
 From the opinion, it can be 
concluded that for a transaction to be considered as dividends the one receiving said dividends 
needs to own actual asset stocks in the company that gives him certain rights under the 
company laws. Having a claim against a company is not to be considered in the meaning of 
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art. 9 ITC payments to the claimants and should therefore be considered interest and not 
dividends. 
Conclusion: The Icelandic tax code is rather simple; most parts of relevant articles relating to 
corporation taxation have been covered here. Concerning any future legislation regarding thin 
capitalization the obvious problems are unclear definitions, a definition for company groups 
needs to be added to the income tax code instead of this “crossover” into Corporation laws. 
Also, as described in ch. 4.3 on dividends this crossover between the tax code and corporation 
law, creates legal uncertainty that needs to be ratified. A part from this the tax codes 
definitions seem to be similar to definitions in other jurisdictions and international 
agreements. Adjusting the code for any future thin cap legislation should therefore not cause 
many problems. In regards to Aluminium plants discussed it seems as the interest they are 
paying to their parent and or sister companies are within the definition of interests of the ITC. 
As regards to dividends and the possibility to reclassify those interest as dividends it seems to 
be the opinion of the tax revenue itself that any such reclassification is not within the current 
scope of the tax law.  
5. Possible solutions 
In an interview regarding the tax avoidance schemes of the Aluminium plants in March 2013, 
Katrin Juliusdottir, then Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs said that it was of course 
not good if someone was not taxed in Iceland on income that had its source in the country. 
She mentioned that a taskforce had been appointed which handed in conclusions last summer 
(2012) about imposing rules on loans between parent companies and subsidiaries or 
connected parties. Katrin also noted that the Icelandic income tax laws already contained a 
rule, which enabled the tax authorities to monitor if there were any unnatural happenings 
taking place, unnatural transactions, or loans between connected parties. For example, those 
parties could take out loans from its parent companies with unnaturally high interests and if 
the tax authorities demonstrate that it was so, then transactions could be changed or altered to 
tax them anyway. Katrin then said that if there were any unnatural loans involved she 
assumed that tax authorities should be able to do something about such arrangements.
86
 In that 
interview, the Minister identifies two possible solutions, firstly using the tax avoidance 
provision in the current tax law and secondly to implement some kind of thin cap legislation. 
In this chapter, author will attempt to take a closer look at the problem itself and then analyze 
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those solutions in two separate chapters with some conclusion at the end of each one. Due to 
an almost complete lack of any Icelandic literature or case law, regarding cross boarder tax 
planning or excessive debt financing this will mostly be this author’s speculation.  
As before mentioned two of the major players in the Icelandic thin cap “scheme” are Alcoa 
and Norðurál. Unfortunately it was not possible to get a more recent copy of the annual report 
for Alcoa Iceland then the one from 2009, that did not cause this author much concern as from 
looking at the ones from the years before it seems the EBITDA has stayed ca. the same each 
year. Another problem was that for some reason the annual reports of Norðurál did not 
contain sufficient information to calculate the EBITDA. 
Norðurál 2011:  
Profits before financial revenue and expenses was approx. 2,7 M US$, assuming the company 
had no operational expenses we can try and use that number as a “fake” EBITDA for 
calculations sake. 
EBITDA: 2,7 M US$ 
Debt/Equity ratio = 43:1  
Long term liabilities: 
Subordinated Loan = 897 M US$ 
Liability to related party = 1,4 M US$ 
Interest expenses = 96 M US$ 
Income tax paid = 0
87
 
Alcoa 2009:  
EBITDA = - 52.64 M US$ 
Debt/Equity ratio = ?  In all the annual reports the author has its hands on the equity has been 
in minus, therefore there is no way to calculate the ratio 
Loans from related parties =US$ 1.601.309 M US$  
Interest expenses = 90 M US$ 
Income tax paid: 0
88
 
From this and the picture shown in ch. 2 it seems clear that what these companies are doing is 
simple, they are highly leveraged with debt from related parties, they pay high interests to 
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related parties and no income tax, losses, and carry forward taxable deductions to be used 
against any future profits.  
5.1. Implementing Thin Cap rules 
In her interview, Katrin mentioned the works of a taskforce from last summer (2012); the 
suggestion put forth in its conclusions was that if implementing any rules regarding 
limitations of the deductibility of interest, earning test approach like the EBITDA rules in 
Germany, should be the benchmark for consideration.
89
 The earnings test limits the amount of 
deductible interest expense as a percentage of earnings before interest costs and tax (EBIT) or 
earnings before interest costs, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). This approach 
normally allows first the reduction of interest expenses up to the interest income received in 
the same year. In addition, any net interest expense—i.e., the excess interest expense over the 
interest received in the same year—is deductible up to a percentage of the EBIT. Often, the 
latitude for net interest expenses broadens by using the EBITDA. Any non-deductible net 
interest expenses can be carried forward indefinitely. To prevent administrative difficulties 
and avoidance, the ratio of allowed interest to earnings is the same across industries. This 
method could create difficulties in businesses with unusually volatile profits, which would see 
some legitimate interest costs disallowed in low-profit years and would be well below their 
allowed cap in good-profit years. A sufficiently generous EBITDA limit and the carry-
forward provision, however, would mitigate this shortcoming. On the other hand, the 
allowable interest deduction ceiling is more uncertain ex ante than a debt-to-equity test, as it 
known only after profit realization and the income statement is drawn.
90
The conclusions of 
the task force suggested implementing a rule that adds a paragraph to art. 57 ITC saying that 
deductable interest of loans from affiliated companies to be limited at 30% of EBITDA, 
exempt from the limitations would be companies with EBITDA lower then approx. 1 M Euro 
and interest cost on loans whose interest proven to be close to what could be agreed between 
unrelated parties.
91
It is the opinion of this author that these kind of rules would not go far as to 
prevent or somehow give tools to counter behaviour such as that of Alcoa or Norðurál. They 
are holding companies, which by nature often have low taxable EBITDA. Moreover, the loans 
in question have interest in the range of 8 to 9,5% which could well be found to be within 
arm’s length. If not, although not mentioned in the before mentioned suggestions and 
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assuming that only the interest exceeding the arms length interest rate would be taxable, the 
increase in tax revenue would probably be minimal.  
Conclusion: It is highly unlikely that implementing thin cap rules similar to those suggested 
by the Ministry task force or the IMF will provide any tools tax authorities’ could use to 
increase the tax revenue regarding the aluminium plants in question. There are at least two 
reasons for that, first there is the fact that it seems that their owners are for the time being 
“immune” to any changes in law regarding the deductibility of interest. Second, the loans in 
question are probably within or close to the arms length limit, as pointed out in ch. 3.3 arms 
length interest can well exceed 6,5%. Seeing as the interest rates in question are 8 – 9,5% that 
does not leave much left for taxation, that is even ignoring the facts that the corporations in 
question could simply lower the interest rates to reach the arms length limit. 
5.2. Using Current Tax Avoidance Provisions  
Would it be as mentioned by the ex minister of Finance, possible to use the current Icelandic 
tax avoidance legislation to tax the payments made by the aluminium plants to their sisters 
and parents in other countries? 
If tax persons in concluding financial agreements do so in a way that is significantly different 
from what is common in similar transactions on the open market, any valuables that without 
such an unusual agreement would have gone to either of the parties, but do not because of 
said agreement, shall be counted as taxable income for that person.
92
 The provision has a 
foundation in article 9 of the OECD model tax treaty as that article was at the time of 
legislation in 1971. That text is substantively identical to the original provision in the tax law, 
but the Icelandic provision has become a bit wider as it includes both individuals and 
corporations, but narrower in the sense that the difference between the contractual interest 
terms must be considerable, whereas art. 9 of the Model Convention refers to the terms having 
to be "different"
93
 According to this rule, the courts and tax authorities can look past transactions 
and agreements  if their purpose was mainly to achieve a tax advantage, but not done for normal 
operational purposes. Transactions between related parties are then adjusted to conform to reality 
by assessing the actual financial and business aspects of the transactions. 94 The Reality Principle 
is not considered as having independent statutory authority, since it constitutes a prerequisite for 
the tax system, and gets its legal basis in the main principle of ITC, according to art. 1, 2, and 7 
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ITC which prescribes what is to be considered taxable income and that taxable entities must pay 
taxes on all their income.95 A Recent court ruling by an Icelandic court of first instance, 
confirms that assessment, the judgment stated that the so-called "reality principle" derived 
from art. 57 should not be applied in the case since that provisions only regarded transfer 
pricing rules between parties.
96
 Furthermore, in a case appealed to the Supreme Court in 2006, 
the court held that in interpreting the provision one would need to look at the unwritten 
principles regarding tax avoidance on which the provision rested. From that it followed, that 
in no way did the provision allow for the taxation of legal transactions designed to reduce tax 
burden of a taxable person, even though these measures might not be customary and/or rare. 
Courts seem to have confirmed that the provision should be purposely interpreted as entailing 
a principle that allows for substance of an agreement to be taken over its form when it comes 
to taxation. It is therefore a general tax avoidance or reality rule, a reality that has been shaped 
by case law and allows taxation to be based on what has actually happened in a way that gives 
tax authorities the ability to assess independently whether a monopoly regulated instrument 
has led to a situation that actually exist and can be used as base for taxation.
 97
  
Conclusion: This overview of the rather limited tax avoidance provision of Icelandic tax law 
shows that there might be a way to tax the interest payments the aluminium plants are making 
to their sister and parent companies in other countries by redefining them as dividends. For 
this to be possible, the definition of dividends in tax law might have to be adjusted in the tax 
law, as mentioned at the end of ch. 4.3 having a claim against a company is not to be 
considered payments to the claimants and should therefore be considered interest and not 
dividends. In the light of complete lack of case law, this author can only guess that this might 
prove rather difficult. The “conclusion” must therefore be that in theory, this way might be 
possible under current Icelandic laws; with slight adjustments of the definition of dividends, 
those chances might even increase for future “interest” payments of the plants. This author 
hopes that Icelandic courts will get the chance to answer some of these questions in the future. 
5.3. What About EU Law 
Regardless of the aluminium plants discussed in this examination, it is likely that Iceland will 
in the near future implement some sort of interest deduction limitation or thin cap rules, 
members of government have voiced their opinions saying so and there is ongoing work 
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within the Ministry of Finance preparing such legislation. Missing from the suggestions put 
forth so far is any mention of EU law, its case law, or possible infringements with EU law in 
any future legislation. Author can only guess that the reason for this is that the EEA 
Agreement specifically does not cover any EU rules or regulation regarding taxes. This was 
intended as the EFTA countries entering into the agreement wanted to keep all matters 
relating to taxes outsides its scope. Iceland is however, according to the Supreme Court, in a 
case involving the supremacy of the EEA agreement, when it comes to legislation, Iceland is 
bound by the international obligations it has undertaken and the legislator must consider them 
when applying its powers of taxation.
98
 Icelandic government has an obligation either to 
implement some provisions of international agreements into its laws or to harmonize national 
law and the provisions of international agreements. In addition, there are sometimes 
obligations on member states to interpret international laws in accordance with its 
international law obligations. Art. 3 of Act no. 2/1993 on the European Economic Area states 
that laws and regulations should be interpreted to an extent applicable, in accordance with the 
EEA Agreement and the rules on which the agreement is built upon. The EEA Agreement 
forms an integral part of the Community legal order, it has primacy, and direct effect in 
Community Member States, just as any EC legislation does. The EC fundamental freedoms 
include the EFTA states, protecting all EEA nationals throughout the whole area. These joint 
freedoms have been confirmed by the ECJ and the EFTA Court to be the same, as regards to, 
for example the free movement of capital. Denying benefits to EFTA nationals while granting 
them to Community nationals may be in breach of the EEA fundamental freedoms. This can 
happen if a Community member states national legislation is discriminatory or restricts 
market access. When EFTA state nationals objectively fulfil the requirement of being in 
comparable situation as nationals of EC member states, denying them the benefits of the 
legislations constitutes discrimination in breach of the EEA fundamental freedoms.
99
 This is 
important as this indicates that a ruling such as the one in the before mentioned Lankhorst-
Hohorst case, the then German rules regarding thin capitalization were found to be in breach 
of the freedom of establishment, would have affect on any laws or regulations regarding the 
same in Iceland. Therefore, the Icelandic legislator would need to have the case law of the 
ECJ in mind when making new tax rules regarding thin capitalization because of the EEA 
agreement, even if said agreement specifically excludes taxes from its scope. Even  been 
suggested is that the German Zinsschranke causes unequal treatment and that it is not in line 
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with the definition of profit under the parent-subsidiary directive and in breach of the freedom 
of establishment.
100
Other relevant ECJ judgements on the matter are C-196/04 Cadbury 
Schweppes, C-212/97 Centros, C- 231/05 OY AA, C-524/04 Thin Cap Group Litigation and 
others. 
Conclusion: Even if taxes are excluded from the scope of the EEA agreement, EU law and its 
case law needs to be kept in mind in any legislation regarding limitations on interest 
deductions, the fundemental freedoms have been in question in many ECJ cases and as 
pointed out here Icelandic legislation can not violate those freedoms. 
6. Conclusion 
Obvious from the words of the former (changed 24/5 ’13) ministers of finance and industry it 
is the will of the government to tax the income of the corporations in question in Iceland 
instead of them being able to “deliver” their profits to their parent and or sister companies in 
other tax jurisdictions in the form of interest. The legal question then is if that is possible, 
either with current legislation or by changing it. From the overview of Icelandic laws in ch. 4, 
the conclusion was that those interest payments were within the tax codes definitions of 
interests and are therefore “ok” in that respect. Ch. 5.2 discussed the possibility of using the 
current tax avoidance provisions of the tax code to somehow; with the conclusion that in 
theory, it could be possible but under the current legislation, it was unlikely to succeed. Some 
ruling from Icelandic courts on that matter would however be very much appreciated. The 
option of implementing some thin cap or interest deduction limitation rules was discussed in 
ch. 5.1 with the conclusion that legislation similar to the one already suggested by a task force 
set up by the Ministry of Finance would most likely not succeed in increasing any tax revenue 
from the corporations in question. 
The answer to the question “Is it possible to solve problems associated with multinational 
corporations taking advantage of the lack of Thin Capitalization rules in Iceland with current 
legislation or by implementing new rules?” Must therefore be that it is unlikely that current 
legislations anti avoidance provisions can solve that problem and that the current ideas 
regarding new legislation are unlikely to succeed as well. It is the opinion of this author that 
the way most likely to succeed would be to implement provisions into the tax code that made 
it easier for tax authorities to make transactional changes to such interest payments and 
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redefine them as dividends. The problem however with such a solution is that one can easily 
circumvent it by simply going through a third party. In the case of the aluminium plants, for 
example, the foreign owners could put huge amounts of money into a bank account and agree 
with that bank that in return it would lend the Icelandic corporations the same amount 
charging a bit more interest on the loan then the pay in savings account. It is this author’s 
opinion that in light of the problems with thin cap or interest limitation rules in other 
countries, implementing such rules is not necessarily the best solution for Iceland. It would 
not affect that many corporations, and the gain in tax revenue might be minimal. Instead, 
adding to the existing tax avoidance provision some clear rules allowing for transactional 
changes from interests to dividends when excessive interests are paid on loans to shareholders 
or affiliated companies without there being any obvious operational reasons for such loans. 
The business purpose test of the ITC might prove useful in such determination:  “in order for 
an expense to be deductable, it has for that year, have had the purposes of earning the 
income”.101 Loans taken out from shareholders or affiliated companies that failed that test 
would then be considered as equity contributions and not loans and all interest payments 
taxed as dividends.  
In any case, the Icelandic Tax Code need some overhaul; it needs clear definitions of interests, 
dividends, and consolidated company groups, clear rules regarding tax accounting standards 
would be a good addition as well. Moreover, the tax avoidance provision, regardless of future 
implementation of thin cap rules could use some makeover. As it is, it seems to be in the 
hands of the courts rather than the legislator how certain tax planning behaviours should be 
treated, this is not ideal; the courts need clear directions from law rather than having to make 
the laws up themselves.  
Finally, and somewhat off topic the author would like to point out that empirical evidence has 
shown that thin cap or interest deduction limitation rules seem to reduce investments up to a 
point where that loss is more than any gain in tax revenue while at the same time increasing 
tax competition.
102
This might be ok for larger countries like Germany but for smaller 
countries, increased tax competition may not be such a good thing. Before any steps are taken 
in restricting the deductibility of interests, the Icelandic legislator should consider all possible 
affects, not simply the possible increase in tax revenue. 
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